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CHALLENGES IN UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 
In a round-up speech on trade that I made in 1965 shortly 
after I took office as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, I talked about the challenges then facing United States 
trade policy. These challenges, as I saw them, came from three 
directions. The first was the future pattern of our trade re-
lations with the rich industrial nations of the free world. The 
challenge was whether the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations 
then underway in Geneva could be brought to a successful con-
clusion or would bog down, peter out, and be followed by a revival 
of protectionism. The second challenge was how we in the U.S. 
and the other industrial countries proposed to deal with the trade 
problems of the more than 100 independent nations of the develop-
ing world, the low-income countries for whom trade has not, as a 
general matter, been an engine of growth. And the third challenge 
was our trade relations with the Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe and the USSR. The question here was whether the policies 
we had followed for two decades continued to serve our interests, 
or whether changes in the Communist world and in the world at large 
had made some aspects of that policy obsolete. 
Progress in meeting these challenges has been mixed. The 
Kennedy Round was a brilliant success, achieving tariff reductions 
of greater depth and breadth than ever before. Together with other 
rich countries we have reached agreement on new trade policies to 
help the poor countries, but there are hurdles ahead before these 
can be made effe~tive. And we have had setbacks rather than gains 
in East-West trade policy. 
Today I would like to review with you some of the challenges 








The most immediate and critical issue is the powerful drive 
for quota protection that got underway shortly after the Kennedy 
Round was concluded last year. During the cliff-hanging episodes 
of the Kennedy Round negotiations, we had feared that the failure 
of that ambitious effort would provoke a protectionist reaction. 
In the event, it was our success that had that result. It is 
probably the case that in trade policy, standing still is not an 
equilibrium position ... either we go forward toward freer trade 
or we will be pushed back. The achievements of the Kennedy Round 
were unprecedented; so too is the strength of the protectionist 
push we are now sustaining. Among the quota-seekers are not 
only the small traditional protectionist industries, but also 
large and basic industries like steel and textiles. 
The fundamental issue here, as I see it, is whether these 
industries are seeking temporary amelioration of a difficult 
situation or permanent protection. Our trade policy is not in-
flexible. We do not say to industries or sectors of industries 
whose markets are being disrupted by flooding imports: 
"Competi tio_n is our life style. You mus~ sink o: swim. 11 All 
trading countries have a valid interest in assuring that n~ 
industry or sector is run down precipitately by reason of import 
competition. 
We have a range of measures available to us to help 
affected industries. We can provide adjustment assistance, that 
is, technical aid, loans, or loan guarantees tq business firms 
under competitive pressure from imports; and subsistence allowances, 
relocation expenses, and retraining opportunities for workers. The 
adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
were designed for this purpose, but the criteria proved too rigid to 
be workable. We proposed liberalized criteria in this year's trade 
bill, but Congress did not act on our recommendation although this 
particular provision of the trade bill was not controversial. I 
hope the new Administration and the new Congress will enact it. 
Adjustment assistance, even on liberalized criteria, may not 
be an adequate remedy in some cases. We may find it necessary to 
invoke the escape clause as well, that is, to curtail imports by 
quota or tariff protection for a temporary period during which the 
affected industry can make necessary adjustments to become com-
petitive. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 tightened the escape 
clause rules, requiring applicants for such relief to prove that 
imports were increasing, that tariff concessions were the major 
cause of the increase in imports, and that the increase in imports 
was the major cause of injury. It is my personal view that the 
criteria should be modified. The crucial issue is the effect of 
increased imports on the domestic industry, and not whether the 
import increase resulted in major part from tariff concessions. It 
would seem to me to be sufficient to require proof that the in-
crease in imports has been the major cause of significant injury. 
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At the same time, I do not think we should provide escape 
clause relief for the entire output of an industry when the 
weak points may be only a few products. Where the industry is 
basically healthy but sustaining significant injury from imports 
in a few product lines, we should provide temporary protection 
only for those selected products. I believe this to be the case 
in the textile industry. 
Nor do I believe we should make permanent, by periodically 
renewing an escape clause action, what is intended to be a tem-
porary adjustment period. After all, invoking the escape clause 
to help one industry is not without its costs to other industries 
and to the U.S. consumer. The international rules oblige 
countries to pay compensation for trade concessions they with-
draw, or to face retaliation. 
The third option to secure temporary relief from excessive 
import competition is to persuade the major foreign suppliers of 
a particular commodity to exercise voluntary export restraint, 
that is, to moderate the flow of exports that are proving disrup-
tive. The number of cases where this is feasible is quite limited. 
In a few cases, the foreign governments or the industries of the 
supplying countries may be prepared to do this, rather than to 
press their competitive advantage too far ... making inevitable 
an escape clause action or worse ... if the export restraint 
requested of them is not excessive and is for a reasonable period 
of time. Recourse to this option means that we do not have to 
pay compensation or_ face retaliation. 
All these measures for relief: adjustment assistance, escape 
clause action, or voluntary export restraint are forms of transi-
tional assistance, whereas the protective quotas that some 
industries have been pressing Congress to legislate are permanent 
protection. If we enact permanent quota protection for industry, 
especially for an industry as basic as steel, or forman-made, 
textiles, we will pay heavily for such action. We will face re-
taliation on a major scale and in precisely those industries which 
have a strong export record and potential. We should bear in mind 
President Johnson's warning: "A vicious cycle of trade restric-
tions harms most the nation which trades most, and America is that 
nation." 
Nor should we forget that the industrial users here in the 
United States of protected products will pay higher prices for 
these products, and their competitive position in both the domestic-
and the international market will be undermined as a result. We 
need imports as a brake on domestic prices, in the interests of our 
consumers and producers. 
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I personally believe that we will see reasonable voluntary 
export restraints on steel in place before the end of the year. 
My office has served as the coordinating point in the Executive 
Branch for these complicated consultations. It will be very much 
harder to negotiate voluntary restraints in wool and synthetic 
textiles. Unlike steel, where the negotiations are proceeding 
with the representatives of foreign industry directly, a textile 
arrangement would have to be a government-to-government agreement 
because both the companies involved and the countries in which 
they produce are far too numerous. 
If the new Administration and the Congress should be persuaded 
to provide permanent, rather than transitional, protection to these 
industries -- which in my.view would be ultimately recognized as 
an error but prove difficult to undo -- then I think some mechanism 
for varying these quotas in relation to price movements or for 
surveillance of domestic prices in these industries will have to be 
devised to protect the U.S. consumer and industrial users from 
rising prices that protection would otherwise bring in train. 
Let me leave the issue of protectionism and turn now to another 
major challenge that faces our trade policy ..• the challenge of 
non-tariff barriers. With the significant reduction in tariff 
barriers effected in the Kennedy Round, non-tariff barriers have 
come into prominence. These include such diverse measures as pre-
ferences to domestic suppliers in government procurement, health 
and safety measures that are used with protectionist intent, burden-
some customs formalities and valuation procedures, labelling 
requirements to discourage imports, and various government aides to 
industry. At u. s. initiative, the GATT -- the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade -- is studying this question and the related 
question of subsidies. It is working on an inventory of non-tariff 
barriers, how they affect trade, and how negotiations for their 
removal might be conducted. Let me note first that we have little 
cause to be self-righteous. The array of U. s. non-tariff barriers 
in industry and complex protective devices in agriculture is not 
insignificant. It will require protracted international and 
bilateral negotiations, taking new forms, to chip away at these 
varied obstacles to trade. 
Among the non-tariff measures that are exciting attention, the 
issue of border taxes is particularly lively. Border taxes affect 
both imports and exports. On the import side, a border tax is a 
charge imposed on imports to place a tax burden on them equivalent 
to that which similar domestic goods bear. On the export side, a 
border tax adjustment is an exemption or rebate to exporters from 
domestic taxes. Under GATT rules, not all taxes qualify for adjust-
ment at the border. Those regarded as eligible are indirect or 
consumption taxes, such as excise, sales, and turnover taxes. 




Border tax adjustments are not new. They have been imposed 
for two decades; they are sanctioned by the GATT; and they are 
deeply embedded in practice. But they have become more visible, 
as tariffs have gone down and border adjustment rates have gone up. 
American businessmen have become deeply concerned by the 
recent sharp increase in border taxes and the prospect of further 
increases, in one European country after another, as these countries 
shift from turnover taxes to value added taxes. Thus the border ad-
justment rates rose in Germany this year, with the shift from turnover 
to value added tax, because the rates previously applied at the border 
had not fully reflected the tax incidence on domestic goods. Both 
turnover and value added ·taxes are indirect taxes that can be levied 
and rebated under GA'l'I' rules. 
The widespread and increasing use of indirect taxes has required 
us to look carefully at the GATT rules. We think these rules --
which sanction levies and rebates for indirect taxes but permit no 
comparable adjustment for direct taxes on business profits -- give 
a competitive edge to countries whose fiscal systems rely heavily 
on indirect taxes. Something is amiss when GATT rules enable 
countries to stimulateexports and imoede imports simply by altering 
their tax structures. · 
At u. s. urging a GATT Working Party was established this year 
to make a wide-ranging examination of the border tax issue. The 
issues are complex, involving technical questions of tax shifting 
and actual government and business practice. We are hopeful that 
from this exploration new rules and procedures will emerge, and 
fuzzy areas -- the question of hidden taxes -- will be clarified. 
Our objective is to ensure that border tax adjustment rules do not 
work in the direction of promoting one kind of tax system over 
another but, rather, are neutral in their effects on the flow of 
international trade. 
Although the problem is a real one, I think the public dis-
cussion indicates that some aspects of it are misunderstood, partly 
because of the terminology "border taxes". The U.S. also has 
indirect taxes which are adjusted at the border. Our Federal excise 
taxes on manufactured goods, like motor vehicles, fishing equipment, 
tires and tubes, are levied on imports as well as on domestic pro-
ducts and are remitted or rebated on exports. Over forty states in 
the u. S. levy sales taxes, ranging in some states to as high as 
6%, and these too are imposed on imports and are not -applied, or 
are rebated, to exports. The value-added tax which is the system 
that most European countries are adopting is essentially a sales 
tax in its design and economic effects. If the Europeans converted 
the value-added tax to a retail sales tax, the economic effect on 
imports and exports would be what it is now. It is true, however, 
that the value-added tax rates in Europe are substantially higher 
than our sales taxes, ranging as high as 20% for France. But, as 
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pointed out by Treasury officials at Congressional hearings, 
the fact is that European countries are high tax countries 
compared to the United States. Not only are their mass sales 
taxes higher, but so too are their social security taxes --
which are not levied at the border or rebated to exporters --
and their direct taxes on business profits are appreciable. 
We have substantial unfinished business in the field of 
agriculture which has proved particularly resistant to trade 
liberalization. The average income of the farm sector in rich 
countries tends to be below that of other sectors in their 
economies. High price supports to improve farm income raise 
domestic agricultural prices well above world price so that 
barriers are necessary to keep out cheaper imports and subsidies 
are necessary to move over-priced goods into export. In principle, 
farm incomes can be improved in ways that are not trade inhibit-
ing, for example, by direct income payments to farmers that do 
not raise prices above world levels or unduly stimulate production. 
But price supports are preferred by governments -- as well as 
farmers -- for many reasons, including the fact that, unlike in-
come or deficiency·payments, price supports are paid by the consumer 
and are not a direct charge on the government budget. 
In the European Economic Community, high price supports with-
out any production control are proving very expensive. Large 
surpluses are emerging which must be stored or subsidized for 
export. The present policy is not self-correcting. It is damaging 
to others and invites retaliation. The EEC is considering policy 
changes, including production controls for commodities in surplus 
and land retirement programs for small farms. It is in their 
interest as well as ours that they also lower their high support 
levels, and that together we devise cooperative, rather than com-
petitive arrangements, for the disposal of surpluses. 
Finally, in this area of trade relations among the industrial 
countries, an important challenge is whether an international con-
sensus can be reached on across-the-board trade measures that would 
be taken by countries in stubborn balance of payments surplus or 
deficit to assist the international adjustment process. Some 
experts think this is unnecessary and would rely only on exchange 
rate movements. Otheis are beginning to think that adjustment 
measures in the trade account would be a useful tool in themselves. 
I should like to turn now to trade policies affecting the 
developing countries. In the vigorous post-war expansion in inter--
national trade, the trade of the developing countries has lagged. 
The basic reason is their overwhelming dependence on the export of 
raw materials, particularly agricultural products, that have not 
been a dynamic or dependable source of foreign exchange. Demand 
PR Z53 
- 7 -
for many of their key exports, like coffee and tea, is relatively 
sluggish, while their markets for other key products are being 
eroded by synthetics and by the increasing agricultural self-
sufficiencv and protectionism of the advanced countries. 
Compounding the problem of slow growth are the wide and destabi-
lizing swings in price to which their commodity exports are 
subject. 
There is no one solution to the commodity problems of the 
developing countries. They need help in curbing overproduction 
where this is the primary cause of depressed prices; they need 
help in improving their ef.ficiency so they can meet the competition 
of synthetics on a price and quality basis; they need improved 
access to the markets of the developed countries. For some 
commodities international agreements regulating production, trade, 
and prices may be both feasible and desirable. The International 
Coffee Agreement, which was renewed and strengthened this year, 
is a case in point. 
In this connection, I should note that the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund are actively exploring appropriate 
measures they can take to help improve and stabilize the commodity 
earnings of the developing countries. I very much hope that these 
key international agencies will play an active part both in develop-
ing and in supporting remedies to the intractable commodity problems 
of the developing countries. 
Nevertheless, even under the most optimistic assumptions as 
to what may be possible to improve and stabilize earnings in 
commodity trade, it is reasonably clear that the developing 
countries must diversify their exports. They still depend on a 
few primary products for more than 85% of their earnings from trade. 
The basic solution for their trade problem is to reduce their 
excessive reliance on raw material exports by increasing the volume 
of their exports of processed and manufactured goods. 
The developing countries want to .get into the manufacturing 
business; and in the past ten years they have increased their 
exports of fabricated goods at a rapid rate. But these exports still 
constitute less than 15% of their total export earnings. Moreover, 
the commodity composition of these exports tends to be narrow --
concentrated in sensitive and regulated products like cotton textiles 
and only a relative handful of the poor countries are involved. 
The trade proposal that has evoked wide and enthusiastic 
support among the poor countries is for temporary tariff preferences 
in all the advanced countries for the manufactured products from all 
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the developing countries. The case for such preferences is that 
they would give the poor countries a tariff advantaae for a Period 
of time over the exports of the mature countries with which they 
feel unable to compete. 
Initially we resisted the proposal. Our traditional trade 
policy has been based on the principle of non-discrimination. But1 
we recognized the force of the argument advanced by the low-income 
countries, that equal treatment is for equals. It is difficult 
to maintain that in the field of processed and manufactured goods, 
Ghana is the competitive equal of Germany in the U.S. market and 
Ecuador is the competitive equal of the U. s. in the German market. 
Even more important, we felt that a system of generalized 
preferences would have the merit of replacing the growing network 
of special preferential arrangements between certain developed 
countries and certain favored less developed countries. Thus the 
developing countries of the British Commonwealth receive preferences 
in the United Kingdom market. And the former African colonies of 
European Economic Community countries receive preferential treatment 
in the EEC market. Moreover, the EEC was actively negotiating new 
preferential arrangements with other countries in East and West 
Africa. Such arrangements discriminate among the poor countries 
themselves, favoring a few at the expense of others. One area of 
the developing world -- Latin America -- which has historically 
had no trade preferences in any market was faced with discrimination 
against its exports nearly everywhere. And U.S. exports were also 
disadvantaged because the recipients of special preferences extended 
reverse preferences to Europe. 
The growing risk of further proliferation of special trade 
arrangements of this kind was from our viewpoint an unfortunate 
development both politically and economically. It threatened to 
fragment world trade; it increased the pressures from Latin America 
for exclusive trade arrangements with the U.S.; it was a retro-
gression to special spheres of influence. 
We determined, therefore, to explore with other countries the 
possibilities of developing a system of generalized preferences that 
could check the growth of, and in time replace, the special pre-
ferential arrangements. 
We have arrived at a broad consensus among the rich and the 
poor countries. At the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development this Spring, the 122 participating nations unanimously 
agreed to seek the early establishment of a mutually acceptable 
system of generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory 
preferences extended by the rich countries for the benefit of all 
the poor countries. 
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Much work remains to be done before the essential elements 
of a preference scheme can be elaborated with sufficient detail 
to form the basis for legislative proposals here and in other 
advanced countries. Some of the key unresolved issues include 
the product coverage of a preference scheme, the depth of tariff 
cut, the safeguards necessary to prevent dislocation in developed 
country markets, the duration of the arrangement, and the issue 
of reverse preferences. On this last issue, we have insisted 
that reverse preferences now enjoyed by the advanceq European 
countries in poor country markets must be phased out if a 
generalized scheme is to come into force. The U. s. cannot be 
expected to provide preferential access to countries that dis-
criminate against our exports in favor of other industrialized 
countries. 
I have dwelt at some length on this subject of generalized 
preferences because it will be a major trade issue facing the- new 
Administration and a controversial one. 
Some who wish to help improve the trade earnings of the 
developing countries contend that a preferable alternative would 
be a concerted effort by the rich countries to eliminate the 
tariff and quota barriers on goods, both agricultural and indus-
trial, that the developing countries can now market on a competitive 
basis. Textiles is a case in point. The issue as they see it is 
not equal treatment versus preferential treatment; the issue is 
access. But the unwillingness in practice of the industrial 
countries to give that access is clear. 
Others suggest that we would be well advised to forget 
generalized preferences and opt instead for special U.S.- Latin 
American preferences, particularly in basic commodities. I do not 
find this alternative persuasive. Many key Latin American export 
commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, bananas, tin, enter the U. s. 
market duty-free. To give Latin America special benefits from the 
sale of these commodities in our market, we would have to install 
preferential tariffs or quotas where none now exist, and these 
would lock out other poor countries in Asia and Africa dependent 
on the u. S. market. 
I have always felt that the best way to assist the developing 
countries is for all the rich countries to join together in a common 
effort to help all the low-income countries. 
The developing countries are facing massive problems in their 
efforts to modernize their economies. Population is pressing hard 
against resources; debt service payments are absorbing an increas-
ing share of their export receipts; the terms of aid are hardening 
as its volume has diminished. Whatever the rich countries may be 
able to do to improve the trade prospects of the poor countries 
should not be a further cause for diminishing aid. The developing 
countries need both trade and aid. 
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I will touch only briefly on our -trade relations with the 
Communist world. Our objectives have been twofold: to maintain 
effective international control over the export of strategic goods 
to the Communist countries of Europe and Asia; and at the same 
time to encourage trade in non-strategic goods with Communist 
Europe, believing that increased peaceful trade with Eastern 
Europe at this point. in its evolution could be a force for con-
structive change. 
We have said many times that the best way we have of 




compatible with our goals of peace and freedom is to bring their peoples 
into close and more pervasive contacts with our free society --
through cultural exchange, tourism, and trade in peaceful goods. 
We have noted that the economic effects of our stricter trade 
and credit controls have not been to deprive Eastern Europe of 
goods -- others can and do supply them as well as we but to 
deny to our farmers and manufacturers an opportunity to compete 
in the markets of Eastern Europe. 
In the emotional atmosphere of the Viet-Nam war, the Congress 
and the American people have not been prepared to move ahead with 
trade liberalization -- and the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia 
has put a further damper on efforts at bridge-building. 
Yet in a perverse way, the events in Czechoslovakia have been 
proof of the liberalizing effects of trade contacts with the West. 
We cannot ignore what has happened in Czechoslovakia. But I 
believe that for the longer term, it is in our interest to do what 
we can to erode the iron curtain. Trade is one instrument to that 
end. When the Viet-Nam war is over, the question of peaceful trade 
with Eastern Europe should become again an operational question for 
the new Administration and Congress. 
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